TY - GEN
T1 - Time Consensus and Censorship Resistance in Blockchains
AU - Breitman, Arthur
AU - Kowalski, Dariusz R.
AU - Krysta, Piotr
N1 - Publisher Copyright:
© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2026.
PY - 2026
Y1 - 2026
N2 - Optimistic rollups are blockchain scaling solutions that reduce main-chain computation while maintaining high security. Rollup operators execute transactions and post state commitments to the main chain, which are assumed valid unless challenged. These challenges let users dispute invalid commitments within a set period, ensuring correctness. However, if challenges can be censored, the rollup’s security and censorship resistance – a core blockchain property requiring all valid transactions to be processed – are compromised. To strengthen transaction verification, we introduce the concept of time consensus, where participants agree on an upper bound for when they received a transaction, using shared randomness and no direct communication. We design single-shot time consensus mechanisms achieving near-optimal trade-offs between success probability and overhead, along with tight lower bounds. These mechanisms yield approximate correlated equilibria approaching exactness as failure probability vanishes - though exact equilibria are impossible. We extend this to multi-shot time consensus with feedback, achieving improved trade-offs and robustness against adversarial manipulation of shared randomness.
AB - Optimistic rollups are blockchain scaling solutions that reduce main-chain computation while maintaining high security. Rollup operators execute transactions and post state commitments to the main chain, which are assumed valid unless challenged. These challenges let users dispute invalid commitments within a set period, ensuring correctness. However, if challenges can be censored, the rollup’s security and censorship resistance – a core blockchain property requiring all valid transactions to be processed – are compromised. To strengthen transaction verification, we introduce the concept of time consensus, where participants agree on an upper bound for when they received a transaction, using shared randomness and no direct communication. We design single-shot time consensus mechanisms achieving near-optimal trade-offs between success probability and overhead, along with tight lower bounds. These mechanisms yield approximate correlated equilibria approaching exactness as failure probability vanishes - though exact equilibria are impossible. We extend this to multi-shot time consensus with feedback, achieving improved trade-offs and robustness against adversarial manipulation of shared randomness.
KW - Attacks on randomness
KW - Blockchains
KW - Censorship resistance
KW - Correlated equilibria with private information
KW - Lower bounds
KW - Randomized mechanisms
KW - Time consensus
KW - Time consensus mechanisms
UR - https://www.scopus.com/pages/publications/105040543968
UR - https://www.scopus.com/pages/publications/105040543968#tab=citedBy
U2 - 10.1007/978-3-032-18660-7_32
DO - 10.1007/978-3-032-18660-7_32
M3 - Conference contribution
AN - SCOPUS:105040543968
SN - 9783032186591
T3 - Lecture Notes in Computer Science
SP - 593
EP - 612
BT - Web and Internet Economics - 21st International Conference, WINE 2025, Proceedings
A2 - Bilò, Vittorio
A2 - Cai, Yang
A2 - Huang, Zhiyi
PB - Springer Science and Business Media Deutschland GmbH
T2 - 21st International Conference on Web and Internet Economics, WINE 2025
Y2 - 8 December 2025 through 11 December 2025
ER -