TY - GEN
T1 - Trusted computing for fault-prone wireless networks
AU - Gilbert, Seth
AU - Kowalski, Dariusz R.
N1 - Copyright:
Copyright 2010 Elsevier B.V., All rights reserved.
PY - 2010
Y1 - 2010
N2 - We consider a fault-prone wireless network in which communication may be subject to wireless interference. There are many possible causes for such interference: other applications may be sharing the same bandwidth; malfunctioning devices may be creating spurious noise; or malicious devices may be actively jamming communication. In all such cases, communication may be rendered impossible. In other areas of networking, the paradigm of "trusted computing" has proved an effective tool for reducing the power of unexpected attacks. In this paper, we ask the question: can some form of trusted computing enable devices to communicate reliably? In answering this question, we propose a simple "wireless trusted platform module" that limits the manner in which a process can access the airwaves by enabling and disabling the radio according to a pre-determined schedule. Unlike prior attempts to limit disruption via scheduling, the proposed "wireless trusted platform module" is general-purpose: it is independent of the application being executed and the topology of the network. In the context of such a "wireless trusted platform module," we develop a communication protocol that will allow any subset of devices in a region to communicate, despite the presence of other disruptive (possibly malicious) devices: up to k processes can exchange information in the presence of t malicious attackers in O( max (t3, k2)log2 n) time. We also show a lower bound: when t < k, any such protocol requires Ω(min)k 2, n) logk n) rounds; in general, at least Ω(min(t3, n2)) rounds are needed, when k ≥ 2.
AB - We consider a fault-prone wireless network in which communication may be subject to wireless interference. There are many possible causes for such interference: other applications may be sharing the same bandwidth; malfunctioning devices may be creating spurious noise; or malicious devices may be actively jamming communication. In all such cases, communication may be rendered impossible. In other areas of networking, the paradigm of "trusted computing" has proved an effective tool for reducing the power of unexpected attacks. In this paper, we ask the question: can some form of trusted computing enable devices to communicate reliably? In answering this question, we propose a simple "wireless trusted platform module" that limits the manner in which a process can access the airwaves by enabling and disabling the radio according to a pre-determined schedule. Unlike prior attempts to limit disruption via scheduling, the proposed "wireless trusted platform module" is general-purpose: it is independent of the application being executed and the topology of the network. In the context of such a "wireless trusted platform module," we develop a communication protocol that will allow any subset of devices in a region to communicate, despite the presence of other disruptive (possibly malicious) devices: up to k processes can exchange information in the presence of t malicious attackers in O( max (t3, k2)log2 n) time. We also show a lower bound: when t < k, any such protocol requires Ω(min)k 2, n) logk n) rounds; in general, at least Ω(min(t3, n2)) rounds are needed, when k ≥ 2.
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U2 - 10.1007/978-3-642-15763-9_33
DO - 10.1007/978-3-642-15763-9_33
M3 - Conference contribution
AN - SCOPUS:78649823884
SN - 3642157629
SN - 9783642157622
T3 - Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)
SP - 359
EP - 373
BT - Distributed Computing - 24th International Symposium, DISC 2010, Proceedings
T2 - 24th International Symposium on Distributed Computing, DISC 2010
Y2 - 13 September 2010 through 15 September 2010
ER -