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Law and politics in judicial oversight of federal administrative agencies

*Corresponding author for this work
  • University of South Carolina
Scholary Output:
Contribution to journal
Article
Peer-review

Open access

Abstract

Administrative agencies play a substantial role in the formulation and implementation of national policy Central to this role is their exercise of discretion. A normative consensus exists that such discretion should be constrained by administrative deference to the rule of law. The courts of appeals are expected to insure that such discretion is constrained. The analysis reported below examines how effectively they fulfill that expectation. The findings suggest that agency success is related to political considerations, with agencies being successful when their decisions are consistent with the policy preferences of the judges. However, variables that captured elements of the legal model were also related to success. Taken together, it appears that the appeals courts respond to both legal concerns and political preferences. Thus, the courts appear to fulfill the expectation that they will constrain the worst abuses of discretion by imposing the rule of law.

Publication Information

Output type

Scholary Output:
Contribution to journal
Article
Peer-review

Original language

English (US)

Pages from-to (Number of pages)

Pages 207-220 (14 pages)

Journal (Volume, Issue Number)

Journal of Politics (Volume 61, Issue 1)

Publication milestones

  • Published - 02/1999

Publication status

Published - 02/1999

ISSN

0022-3816

Publication IDs

  • Scopus: 0033244442

Publication metrics

Metrics

SciVal
citations
40
SciVal
FWCI
0.42
SciVal
Author count
2
SciVal
Paper percentile
82
Scopus
citations
Fractional count
1
Fractional count
0.50
Fractional count
1
Fractional count
0.50
Fractional count
1
Fractional count
1

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Captures
24
Citation count
53