TY - GEN
T1 - Integrity of electronic voting systems
T2 - 27th Annual ACM Symposium on Applied Computing, SAC 2012
AU - Davtyan, Seda
AU - Kiayias, Aggelos
AU - Michel, Laurent
AU - Russell, Alexander
AU - Shvartsman, Alexander A.
N1 - DBLP License: DBLP's bibliographic metadata records provided through http://dblp.org/ are distributed under a Creative Commons CC0 1.0 Universal Public Domain Dedication. Although the bibliographic metadata records are provided consistent with CC0 1.0 Dedication, the content described by the metadata records is not. Content may be subject to copyright, rights of privacy, rights of publicity and other restrictions.
PY - 2012
Y1 - 2012
N2 - In recent years, electronic voting systems have been deployed in all U.S. elections. Despite the fact that cryptographic integrity checks are used in most such systems, several reports have documented serious security vulnerabilities of electronic voting terminals. We present an overview of the typical security and election vulnerabilities found in most, if not all, electronic election systems, and present a case study that illustrates such vulnerabilities. Our hands-on security analysis of the AccuVote TSx voting terminal - - used by more than 12 million voters in over 350 jurisdictions in the U.S. - demonstrates certain new integrity vulnerabilities that are present in the system. We present two attacks based on these vulnerabilities: one attack swaps the votes of two candidates and another erases the name of one candidate from the slate. These attacks do not require modification of the operating system of the voting terminal (as was the case in a number of previous attacks) and are able to circumvent the cryptographic integrity checks implemented in the terminal. The attacks can be launched in a matter of minutes and require only a computer with the capability to mount a PCMCIA card file system (a default capability in most current operating systems). The attacks presented here were discovered through direct experimentation with the voting terminal and without access to any internal documentation or the source code from the manufacturer.
AB - In recent years, electronic voting systems have been deployed in all U.S. elections. Despite the fact that cryptographic integrity checks are used in most such systems, several reports have documented serious security vulnerabilities of electronic voting terminals. We present an overview of the typical security and election vulnerabilities found in most, if not all, electronic election systems, and present a case study that illustrates such vulnerabilities. Our hands-on security analysis of the AccuVote TSx voting terminal - - used by more than 12 million voters in over 350 jurisdictions in the U.S. - demonstrates certain new integrity vulnerabilities that are present in the system. We present two attacks based on these vulnerabilities: one attack swaps the votes of two candidates and another erases the name of one candidate from the slate. These attacks do not require modification of the operating system of the voting terminal (as was the case in a number of previous attacks) and are able to circumvent the cryptographic integrity checks implemented in the terminal. The attacks can be launched in a matter of minutes and require only a computer with the capability to mount a PCMCIA card file system (a default capability in most current operating systems). The attacks presented here were discovered through direct experimentation with the voting terminal and without access to any internal documentation or the source code from the manufacturer.
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U2 - 10.1145/2245276.2232013
DO - 10.1145/2245276.2232013
M3 - Conference contribution
AN - SCOPUS:84863571385
SN - 9781450308571
T3 - Proceedings of the ACM Symposium on Applied Computing
SP - 1486
EP - 1493
BT - 27th Annual ACM Symposium on Applied Computing, SAC 2012
Y2 - 26 March 2012 through 30 March 2012
ER -