TY - GEN
T1 - Key terrain in cyberspace
T2 - 2014 6th International Conference on Cyber Conflict, CYCON 2014
AU - Raymond, David
AU - Cross, Tom
AU - Conti, Gregory
AU - Nowatkowski, Michael
N1 - Publisher Copyright:
© 2014 NATO CCD COE.
PY - 2014/10/3
Y1 - 2014/10/3
N2 - In military doctrine, key terrain refers to areas which, if seized, afford an advantage to an attacker or defender. When applied to geographic terrain, this definition is clear. Key terrain might include a hill that overlooks a valley an enemy wants to control or a crossing point over a river that must be traversed before launching an attack. By definition, dominance of key terrain is likely to decide the overall outcome of a battle. While cyber key terrain is similar to geographic key terrain in some ways, there are also significant and often counterintuitive differences. Some consider cyber terrain to be tied to a physical location and to be represented in cyberspace by routers, switches, cables, and other devices. We will argue that key terrain in cyberspace exists at all of the cyberspace planes, which include the geographic, physical, logical, cyber persona, and supervisory planes [1]. In many cases, features of cyber terrain will not be tied to a specific location, or the geographic location will be irrelevant. In this paper we deconstruct and analyze cyber key terrain, provide a generalized framework for critical analysis, and draw parallels between cyber and physical key terrain while providing examples of key terrain in cyber operations. During a cyber operation, an analysis of key terrain will aid in the strategy and tactics of both the offense and the defense. During peacetime, an understanding of cyber key terrain can be employed broadly, ranging from helping a system administrator focus scarce resources to defend his network all the way to allowing nation-state militaries to develop long-lasting and effective doctrine.
AB - In military doctrine, key terrain refers to areas which, if seized, afford an advantage to an attacker or defender. When applied to geographic terrain, this definition is clear. Key terrain might include a hill that overlooks a valley an enemy wants to control or a crossing point over a river that must be traversed before launching an attack. By definition, dominance of key terrain is likely to decide the overall outcome of a battle. While cyber key terrain is similar to geographic key terrain in some ways, there are also significant and often counterintuitive differences. Some consider cyber terrain to be tied to a physical location and to be represented in cyberspace by routers, switches, cables, and other devices. We will argue that key terrain in cyberspace exists at all of the cyberspace planes, which include the geographic, physical, logical, cyber persona, and supervisory planes [1]. In many cases, features of cyber terrain will not be tied to a specific location, or the geographic location will be irrelevant. In this paper we deconstruct and analyze cyber key terrain, provide a generalized framework for critical analysis, and draw parallels between cyber and physical key terrain while providing examples of key terrain in cyber operations. During a cyber operation, an analysis of key terrain will aid in the strategy and tactics of both the offense and the defense. During peacetime, an understanding of cyber key terrain can be employed broadly, ranging from helping a system administrator focus scarce resources to defend his network all the way to allowing nation-state militaries to develop long-lasting and effective doctrine.
KW - cyber operations
KW - cyber terrain
KW - key terrain
KW - terrain analysis
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=84907930310&partnerID=8YFLogxK
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.url?scp=84907930310&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1109/CYCON.2014.6916409
DO - 10.1109/CYCON.2014.6916409
M3 - Conference contribution
AN - SCOPUS:84907930310
T3 - International Conference on Cyber Conflict, CYCON
SP - 287
EP - 300
BT - International Conference on Cyber Conflict, CYCON
A2 - Brangetto, Pascal
A2 - Maybaum, Markus
A2 - Stinissen, Jan
PB - IEEE Computer Society
Y2 - 3 June 2014 through 6 June 2014
ER -